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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
The question presented for our review is whether 
applying AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions to a 28 U.S.C. 
S 2255 motion filed after AEDPA's effective date would have 
an impermissible retroactive result if the movantfiled his 
first S 2255 motion prior to AEDPA's enactment. We 
conclude that the application of AEDPA's gatekeeping 
provisions to Kevin Roberson's second S 2255 motion would 
have no impermissible retroactive result, and thus we hold 
that amended SS 2244(b)(3)(A) and 2255 require us to deny 
Roberson's request for authorization to proceed with his 
second motion. 
 
I. 
 
On March 3, 1989, Kevin Roberson pleaded guilty to a 
felony information charging him with conspiracy to 
distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
SS 841(a)(1) and 846, distribution of crack cocaine, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1), and aiding or abetting the 
distribution of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. S 2. The District Court sentenced 
Roberson to 30 years of imprisonment on both the 
conspiracy and the distribution counts and ordered 
Roberson to serve the terms concurrently. By means of a 
judgment order, we affirmed Roberson's conviction on 
appeal and rejected his contention that the District Court 
lacked a reasonable factual basis to find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his offense involved the 
distribution of at least 500 grams of cocaine base. 
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On July 17, 1991, Roberson, acting pro se, filed a motion 
under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his 
sentence. See App. at 10-38. One of his arguments was 
that the sentencing court "lacked sufficient facts upon 
which to fairly or reasonably conclude that the defendant 
was responsible for the distribution of 500 grams or more 
of `crack', either individually or as a member of the 
conspiracy." App. at 24. On October 7, 1991, the District 
Court denied Roberson's S 2255 motion, holding that 
Roberson could not raise this argument in his collateral 
attack because we previously had rejected the same 
argument on direct appeal. Appellant's Br. at Tab 6. 
Roberson appealed, App. at 183, and we dismissed his 
appeal on January 31, 1992, for failure to prosecute. App. 
at 184. 
 
On April 24, 1996, the President signed into law the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, which, 
among other things, revised the standards and procedures 
governing S 2255 petitions. Prior to AEDPA's enactment, 
federal courts denied second or successive S 2255 motions 
if the government could demonstrate that the motion 
constituted an abuse of the writ. See McCleskey v. Zant, 
499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991). Courts excused an abuse of the 
writ only if: (1) the applicant could establish cause and 
prejudice -- i.e., that "some objective factor external to the 
defense impeded counsel's efforts" to raise the claim earlier 
and that "actual prejudice result[ed] from the errors of 
which he complain[ed,]" id. at 493-94 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted); or (2) the applicant could 
demonstrate that "a fundamental miscarriage of justice 
would result from a failure to entertain the claim," id. 
 
AEDPA, however, replaced the abuse-of-the writ doctrine 
articulated in McCleskey. Under AEDPA's new 
"gatekeeping" provisions, an applicant seeking to file a 
second or successive S 2255 motion must obtain from "the 
appropriate court of appeals . . . an order authorizing the 
district court to consider the application," 28 U.S.C.A. 
SS 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255 (West Supp. 1999), and a court of 
appeals may grant such an order only if the motion 
contains: 
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       (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and 
       viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be 
       sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
       that no reasonable factfinder would have found the 
       movant guilty of the offense; or 
 
       (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 
       cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that 
       was previously unavailable. 
 
28 U.S.C.A. S 2255. 
 
On May 28, 1997, Roberson filed a second S 2255 motion 
in which he raised two grounds for relief. First, he claimed 
that the sentencing court erred by applying United States 
Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") S 2D1.1(c)'s 
enhancement for cocaine base because the government had 
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
controlled substance involved in his offense was "crack," as 
opposed to some other form of cocaine base. App. at 9. 
Second, he claimed that his counsel at sentencing and on 
direct appeal was constitutionally ineffective for failing to 
raise this argument. Id. 
 
The District Court dismissed Roberson's petition, holding 
that it did not have authority under AEDPA to entertain 
Roberson's second S 2255 motion unless we issued an 
order authorizing it to do so. Appellant's Br. at Tab 4. 
Roberson appealed. As we stated above, AEDPA's 
amendments require S 2255 movants to file a motion in the 
appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the 
district court to consider a second or successive 
application. See 28 U.S.C.A. S 2244(b)(3)(A). Recognizing 
that the application of AEDPA's new gatekeeping provisions 
to Roberson's second S 2255 motion might be impermissibly 
retroactive, we requested that the parties address the 
following question: whether applying AEDPA's gatekeeping 
provisions to a second S 2255 motion, which the applicant 
filed after AEDPA's effective date, would produce an 
impermissible retroactive result if the applicant filed his 
first S 2255 motion before AEDPA's enactment.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Roberson also argues that if we preclude him from bringing his claims 
under S 2255, he should be permitted to bring them through a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. S 2241(c)(3). Appellant's Br. 
at 13. "Because there is no petition under S 2241 before us, we decline 
to address this contention." See Fed. R. App. P. 22(a); United States v. 
Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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II. 
 
We recently addressed a similar retroactivity question in 
In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591 (3d Cir. 1999). In that case, the 
prisoner filed his first federal habeas petition under 28 
U.S.C. S 2254 prior to AEDPA's passage, butfiled his 
second S 2254 motion after AEDPA's effective date. We held 
that the application of AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions to 
Minarik's second petition had no impermissible retroactive 
effect. Id. at 608. In reaching this result, we were guided by 
two Supreme Court decisions: Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 
511 U.S. 244 (1994), and Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 
(1997). We interpreted these cases as establishing the 
following three principles: 
 
       1. There is a strong presumption against applying a 
       statute in a manner that would attach "new legal 
       consequences" to events completed before the statute's 
       enactment, i.e., a manner that would "impair rights a 
       party possessed when he acted, increase a party's 
       liability for past conduct, or impose new duties." 
       Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. 
 
       2. If Congress has focused on the issue, "has 
       determined that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh 
       the potential for disruption or unfairness," and has 
       provided unambiguous evidence of its conclusion by 
       directing that retroactive effect be given, then, and only 
       then, will the presumption be overridden. 
 
       3. Consistent with these principles, normal rules of 
       statutory construction "may apply to remove . . . the 
       possibility of retroactivity." Nothing short of an 
       unambiguous directive, however, will justify giving a 
       statute a retroactive effect. Thus, when normal rules of 
       statutory construction indicate that a statute is 
       intended to be applied in a manner involving no 
       retroactive effect, a Court need inquire no further. On 
       the other hand, if such construction suggests that a 
       retroactive effect may have been intended, the 
       traditional presumption nevertheless bars retroactive 
       application unless an unambiguous congressional 
       directive is found. 
 
In re Minarik, 166 F.3d at 597-98. 
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Informed by these principles, we turn to Roberson's 
argument that applying AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions to 
his second S 2255 motion is impermissibly retroactive. We 
begin our analysis by noting that the gatekeeping 
provisions at issue here, as in Minarik, are part of AEDPA's 
chapter 153 amendments. See AEDPA, SS 105-06, Pub.L. 
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1220-21 (1996). Congress did not 
provide unambiguous evidence of its intent to apply 
AEDPA's chapter 153 amendments to cases in which a 
prisoner filed his first S 2255 or S 2254 motion prior to 
AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh, 521 U.S. at 327-29; 
Minarik, 166 F.3d at 599; United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 
161, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922, 
924 (6th Cir. 1997); Burris v. Parke, 95 F.3d 465, 468 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
 
Furthermore, we held in Minarik that normal rules of 
statutory construction do not remove the possibility of 
retroactivity where a prisoner's first and second S 2254 
petitions straddle AEDPA's effective date. See 166 F.3d at 
598. We stated: 
 
       Lindh held that AEDPA's text, read in light of normal 
       principles of statutory interpretation, evidences a 
       congressional intent that AEDPA's chapter 153 
       amendments should generally be applied to petitions, 
       like Minarik's, filed after April 24, 1996, the effective 
       date of the Act, but not to petitions, like Lindh's,filed 
       before. This does not resolve the issue before us, 
       however. The finding of congressional intent in Lindh 
       was based on the drawing of a negative inference from 
       Congress's express mandate that AEDPA's new rules 
       regarding certain death penalty cases apply to pending 
       cases. Because Congress had expressly provided for 
       application to pending capital cases, but not to 
       pending non-capital cases, it was a fair inference that 
       Congress did not intend retrospective application to the 
       latter. Landgraf and Lindh make clear, however, that 
       while such an inference is sufficient to eliminate the 
       possibility of a retroactivity problem, it is not the kind 
       of unambiguous statement that will justify overriding 
       the judicial presumption against retroactivity in a case 
       where a retroactivity problem exists. 
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Id. Because AEDPA's chapter 153 amendments include the 
gatekeeping provisions for S 2255 motions, we hold that our 
analysis in Minarik applies with equal force here. 
 
Having determined that Congress did not provide 
unambiguous evidence for the retroactive application of the 
gatekeeping provisions and that normal rules of statutory 
construction do not remove the possibility of the 
gatekeeping provisions' retroactive application,"we now 
turn to a case-specific analysis of whether applying 
AEDPA's [gatekeeping provisions to Roberson's second 
S 2255 motion] would have a genuine retroactive effect by 
`attach[ing] new legal consequences to events completed 
before [AEDPA's] enactment.' " Minarik, 166 F.3d at 599 
(quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270). Minarik, which is 
binding on us, is quite clear that the relevant question is 
whether the application of the gatekeeping provisions would 
produce a genuine retroactive effect in the particular case 
at hand, not whether it would generally do so in a broader 
class of cases into which the case at hand falls. See 166 
F.3d at 599 (emphasis added) ("If applying AEDPA's habeas 
corpus amendments would produce a genuine retroactive 
effect in Minarik's case, then Landgraf's default rule 
prohibits their application.' ") 
 
Roberson argues that AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions 
attach "new legal consequences" to his firstS 2255 motion. 
Appellant's Br. at 9-11. Specifically, he claims that under 
pre-AEDPA law, he could have established cause and 
prejudice and that, consequently, a federal court would 
have entertained his second S 2255 motion. He concedes 
that he cannot satisfy AEDPA's new substantive standards,2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Roberson does not argue that the gatekeeping provisions' procedural 
requirement -- viz., that an applicant seeking to file a second or 
successive S 2255 motion in the district courtfirst obtain authorization 
from the court of appeals -- is impermissibly retroactive. This argument 
is foreclosed by our decision in Minarik, 166 F.3d at 599 ("Section 
2244(b)(3)(A) . . . is a change in procedural law which falls within the 
firmly established `procedural change' category described in Landgraf 
that may be retrospectively applied.") (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275 
("Because rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary 
conduct, the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the 
conduct giving rise to the suit does not make application of the rule at 
trial retroactive.")). 
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see Appellant's Br. at 10-11, and he argues, therefore, that 
because AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions impair a right he 
possessed when he filed his first S 2255 motion, applying 
them in his case is impermissibly retroactive.3 
 
As previously noted, Roberson raises two grounds for 
relief in his second S 2255 motion. First, he claims that the 
District Court erred by applying S 2D1.1(c)'s enhanced 
sentencing provisions for crack because the government 
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
controlled substance he pleaded guilty to distributing and 
conspiring to distribute was crack. See App. at 9. He 
contends that he pleaded guilty to distributing and 
conspiring to distribute a form of cocaine base that is not 
subject to S 2D1.1(c)'s enhanced sentencing provisions for 
crack. See id. Second, he claims that his attorney at 
sentencing and on direct appeal was constitutionally 
ineffective for failing to argue, based on S 2D1.1(c)'s 
distinction between crack and other forms of cocaine base, 
that Roberson should not have been sentenced under the 
enhanced sentencing provisions for crack. See id . We 
conclude that Roberson had cause under pre-AEDPA law 
for not including these two grounds in his first S 2255 
motion. We also conclude, however, that he suffered no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Implicit in his concession is an admission that he also cannot 
establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a 
failure to entertain his claims. One of S 2255's new substantive 
standards requires movants to proffer "newly discovered evidence that, if 
proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient 
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable 
factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense." 28 
U.S.C.A. S 2255. Thus, Roberson acknowledges that the claims in his 
second S 2255 motion -- i.e., that the District Court erred by applying 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(c)'s enhanced sentencing provisions for crack and that 
his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise this 
error 
-- do not constitute newly discovered evidence that is sufficient to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is not guilty of the 
underlying offenses. In order to prove that his case implicates a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice, Roberson needs to establish that he 
was "actually innocent." See Bousley v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 
1611 (1998); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). Because he 
concedes that he cannot meet S 2255's innocence standard, he likewise 
cannot satisfy the "actual innocence" standard of pre-AEDPA law. 
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prejudice as a result of these alleged errors and thus that 
a district court would have denied his second S 2255 
motion under pre-AEDPA law. We therefore hold that 
AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions do not have an 
impermissible retroactive effect upon his second S 2255 
motion. 
 
III. 
 
We find that Roberson had "cause" for not raising these 
two grounds in his first S 2255 motion, which he filed in 
July 1991, because the legal distinction between"crack" 
and "cocaine base" for sentencing purposes did not exist 
until November 1, 1993, and because Roberson had no 
duty to anticipate changes in the law. See Sistrunk v. 
Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666, 670-71 (3d Cir. 1996); Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989). In 
1993, the Sentencing Commission amended S 2D1.1(c) to 
include the following definition of cocaine base: 
 
       "Cocaine base," for the purposes of this guideline, 
       means "crack." "Crack" is the street name for a form of 
       cocaine base, usually prepared by processing cocaine 
       hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, and usually 
       appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1 (Note D to Drug Quantity Table). Prior to 
1993, the Sentencing Guidelines had not defined the term 
"cocaine base" in S 2D1.1(c), and no court of appeals had 
held that this term referred only to "crack" and not to other 
forms of cocaine base. See United States v. Rodriguez, 980 
F.2d 1375, 1378 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Jones, 
979 F.2d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Wheeler, 
972 F.2d 927, 930 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam); 
United States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412, 416 (9th Cir. 1991);4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We are aware of the Sentencing Commission's statement that the 
Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 
1991), that "cocaine base means crack." See U.S.S.G., App. C, Amend. 
487 (1997). We disagree with the Sentencing Commission's 
interpretation of Shaw and note that in determining whether a claim is 
 
                                9 
  
United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 960 (10th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1033 (6th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Metcalf, 898 F.2d 43, 46-47 (5th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Brown, 859 F.2d 974, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 
The Supreme Court has held that there may be cause for 
omitting a claim when it " `is so novel that its legal basis is 
not reasonably available to counsel.' " Bousley v. United 
States, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1611 (1998) (quoting Reed v. Ross, 
468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)). In Bousley, the petitioner pleaded 
guilty in 1990 to "using" a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(c) and later sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. S 2241, which the District Court treated as a motion 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255. Bousley, 118 S. Ct. at 1607. 
The District Court dismissed the petitioner's S 2255 motion, 
and he appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit. See id. While Bousley's appeal was pending, the 
Supreme Court decided Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 
137 (1995), in which it held that a conviction for "use" 
under S 924(c)(1) required the government to show not only 
"mere possession," but "active employment of the firearm" 
as well. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 144. The Eighth Circuit 
subsequently affirmed the District Court's decision, 
rejecting Bousley's argument that Bailey should be applied 
retroactively. See Bousley, 118 S. Ct. at 1608. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
so novel that it constitutes cause to excuse an abuse of the writ, we are 
not bound by the Sentencing Commission's reading of a circuit court's 
opinion. In Shaw, the defendant argued that he could not be sentenced 
under the guideline provision applicable to offenses involving "cocaine 
base." The defendant maintained "the legal definition of `cocaine base' is 
a cocaine compound containing a hydroxylion (OH-) such that it is a 
`base,' as that term is used in chemistry." 936 F.2d at 414. "Because the 
government's expert did not say anything about the presence of a 
hydroxylion," the defendants argued that they could not be sentenced for 
cocaine base. Id. Rejecting this argument, the court wrote: "[W]e 
conclude that . . . the Commission must have intended the term `cocaine 
base' to include `crack,' or `rock cocaine,' " and that the Commission did 
not intend "the term `cocaine base' to be defined by the presence of a 
hydroxylion or by its testing basic rather acidic." Id. at 416 (emphasis 
added). Plainly, a holding that the term "cocaine base" includes crack is 
not the same as a holding that "cocaine base means crack." U.S.S.G., 
App. C, Amend. 487 (1997). 
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On appeal to the Supreme Court, Bousley argued, in an 
attempt to establish cause, that the legal basis for his claim 
was not "reasonably available to counsel at the time his 
plea was entered." Bousley, 118 S. Ct. at 1611 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court rejected 
this argument, noting that it "was most surely not a novel 
one" and that "at the time of petitioner's plea, the Federal 
Reporters were replete with cases involving challenges to 
the notion that `use' is synonymous with mere 
`possession.' " Id. (citations omitted). Here, however, the 
argument that cocaine base, as used in S 2D1.1, included 
only crack and excluded all other forms of cocaine base was 
novel at the time of Roberson's first S 2255 motion. The 
Federal Reporters, as we already noted, did not contain a 
single case reaching this conclusion. Accordingly, we hold 
that Roberson had cause for failing to raise in hisfirst 
S 2255 motion the two grounds that he advanced in his 
second S 2255 motion.5 
 
Although we find that Roberson could have established 
cause for the two claims he raised in his second S 2255 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Roberson contends that he has established "cause" under McCleskey 
because he proceeded pro se in his first S 2255 motion. Appellant's Br. 
at 11 n.4. We disagree. In McCleskey, the Court held that the application 
of the cause and prejudice standard does not "imply that there is a 
constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas corpus." 499 U.S. at 
495 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987)). 
Accordingly, the Court, in setting forth a single standard for "cause," 
made no distinction between pro se defendants and those who are 
represented by counsel. See Cornman v. Armontrout, 959 F.2d 727, 729 
(8th Cir. 1992) (stating that the requirement of cause in the abuse of the 
writ context "is not lessened by the fact that the petitioner may . . . 
have 
filed the initial habeas petition pro se"); Saahir v. Collins, 956 F.2d 
115, 
118 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Because a habeas petitioner is not constitutionally 
entitled to any legal representation in waging a collateral attack, the 
McCleskey `knew or reasonably should have known' standard for cause 
applies irrespective of whether he was represented by counsel when he 
filed any previous petitions."); Rodriguez v. Maynard, 948 F.2d 684, 687 
(10th Cir. 1991) ("We hold that, in abuse of the writ cases, the cause and 
prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners just as it applies to 
petitioners represented by counsel."). We hold, therefore, that the fact 
that Roberson filed his first S 2255 petition pro se does not constitute 
cause in the abuse of the writ context. 
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motion, we hold that he could not have demonstrated 
prejudice for either one. We will address each claim in turn. 
 
A. 
 
Roberson claims that the government did not prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the controlled 
substance in question was "crack." Appellant's Br. at 10. 
Relying on our decision in United States v. James, 78 F.3d 
851 (3d Cir. 1996), Roberson contends that he did not 
plead guilty to possession or distribution of crack. 
Appellant's Reply Br. at 3. Rather, he asserts that he 
pleaded guilty to possession or distribution of cocaine base. 
Id. In further support of his argument, Roberson notes that 
"there was no laboratory analysis of the substances seized." 
Id. Roberson argues, based on this record, that the District 
Court erred in applying S 2D1.1(c)'s enhanced sentencing 
provision for crack and that this error resulted in prejudice. 
We reject Roberson's argument for three reasons. 
 
First, he waived the argument that he pleaded guilty to 
distributing a form of cocaine base other than crack. "A 
waiver of rights must be knowing and voluntary." James, 
78 F.3d at 856 (citing United States v. Newman, 912 F.2d 
1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1990) (voluntary plea requires real 
notice of the true nature of the charge)). In James, the 
defendant pleaded guilty to selling 57.4 grams of cocaine 
base. See id. at 853. The District Court, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(c), sentenced James under the enhanced 
sentencing provisions for crack. James argued that the 
District Court erred in applying S 2D1.1(c)'s enhancement 
for crack because he did not plead guilty to possession or 
distribution of crack. See id. at 856. 
 
We found that the record, on the whole, supported his 
argument. There, the indictment charged James "with 
distribution and possession of a `substance containing a 
detectable amount of cocaine base.' " Id . at 855. 
Additionally, the parties stipulated in the plea agreement 
that "for purposes of determining . . . James' offense level 
under the Sentencing Guidelines, . . . the relevant quantity 
of cocaine base is 57.4 grams." Id. at 855-56. Finally, 
during the plea colloquy, James admitted that he 
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distributed "cocaine base," but made no such admission 
with respect to "crack." Id. at 856. While we noted that the 
prosecutor referred to the controlled substance in question 
three times as "crack cocaine,"6  we held that, "without 
more, the causal reference to crack by the Government in 
the colloquy with the court over `the relevant quantity of 
cocaine base in determining Mr. James's offense level' did 
not amount to a "knowing and voluntary admission that 
the cocaine base constituted crack." Id. at 856. 
 
Here, the superseding information charged Roberson with 
distributing and conspiring to distribute "a substance 
containing cocaine base, known as `crack' cocaine." App. at 
178-79. Moreover, Roberson pleaded guilty in his plea 
agreement to "distribution of crack cocaine" and 
"conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine." App. at 169. Thus, 
in contrast to James, Roberson's plea to distributing and 
conspiring to distribute "crack" was knowing and voluntary. 
 
Second, the government proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the substance in question was crack. We 
review for clear error a district court's factual determination 
that the substance a defendant distributed was crack. See 
United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 1998); 
United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 1997). 
" `Factual findings are clearly erroneous if the findings are 
unsupported by substantial evidence, lack adequate 
evidentiary support in the record, are against the clear 
weight of the evidence or where the district court has 
misapprehended the weight of the evidence.' " Roman, 121 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. During the plea colloquy, the prosecutor stated: 
 
       The parties agree that the relevant quantity of cocaine base in 
       determining Mr. James's offense level is 57.4 grams. That's the 
total 
       net weight of the crack cocaine that was purchased in each of the 
       three transactions that comprise Counts One, Two and Three. 
 
       . . . 
 
       Mr. James exchanged a plastic baggy that contained some 
       suspected crack cocaine. That was sent to a lab, analyzed, and was 
       determined to be -- I believe the net weight was 22.0 grams of 
       cocaine base or crack cocaine. 
 
78 F.3d at 856 (emphasis in original). 
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F.3d at 140 (quoting Davin v. United States Dep't of Justice, 
60 F.3d 1043, 1049 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 
Here, unlike James, we note that the government, the 
witnesses, and even Roberson's trial attorney consistently 
referred to the controlled substance in question as crack 
cocaine. See, e.g., App. at 47 (testimony of Troy 
Smallwood); App. at 68-69 (testimony of Ryan Edward 
Palmer); App. at 74, 122-23 (testimony of Senia Patricia 
Lewis); App. at 88 (testimony of Jamie Herrell); App. at 82, 
122 (defense counsel); App. at 142 (prosecutor's comments 
to the District Court Judge). Because S 2D1.1 defines 
"crack" as "the street name for a form of cocaine base," see 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(c), Note (D) to Drug Quantity Table, we 
find the witnesses' testimony especially compelling. See 
United States v. Hall, 109 F.3d 1227, 1236 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 
Moreover, we noted in Roman that "where a written plea 
agreement is entered[,] questions of notice and proof at 
sentencing could be greatly minimized by simply including 
language in the plea agreement by which a defendant 
acknowledges the identity of the drugs involved." 121 F.3d 
at 141 n.4. Here, as we stated above, Roberson pleaded 
guilty to distributing "crack." Therefore, any question of 
proof we have concerning whether Roberson distributed 
crack is "greatly minimized." 
 
Roberson also argues that the government failed to meet 
its burden of proof, at least in part, because it did not 
perform a laboratory analysis of the substance at issue. 
Appellant's Reply Br. at 3. We find this argument 
unpersuasive. It is not necessary for the government to 
perform a chemical analysis to prove that the substance at 
issue is crack, as opposed to another form of cocaine base. 
See Dent, 149 F.3d at 190; Roman, 121 F.3d at 141. 
 
Third, Roberson cannot establish prejudice because the 
1993 amendment to S 2D1.1(c) ("Amendment 487") effected 
a substantive change in the law, and substantive 
amendments -- in contrast to clarifying amendments-- are 
not given retroactive effect. See U.S.S.G.S 1B1.11(b)(2) 
(1998); United States v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 490 (3d 
Cir. 1998). As we stated in Marmolejos, "[t]here is no bright- 
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line test for determining whether an amendment to the 
Guidelines `clarifies' the existing law; `these categories [are] 
unclear, and as is usually the case, there are factors 
supporting either side.' " 140 F.3d at 491 (quoting United 
States v. Prezioso, 989 F.2d 52, 53 (1st Cir. 1993)). Among 
other factors, we have considered: (1) "whether, as a matter 
of construction, the guideline and commentary in effect at 
that time is really consistent with the amended manual," 
United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1405 (3d Cir. 1994); 
and (2) whether the amendment resolves an ambiguity in 
the guideline or commentary. See Marmolejos, 140 F.3d at 
491-93. 
 
Amendment 487 overruled prior constructions of 
S 2D1.1(c). Compare United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 
320 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that crack is a form of cocaine 
base), with U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 487 (1997) ("Under 
this amendment, forms of cocaine base other than crack 
. . . will be treated as cocaine."). Because Amendment 487 
overruled our prior construction of the guideline, we are 
inclined to hold that it effected a substantive change. See 
Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1405. 
 
This holding is supported by our conclusion that 
Amendment 487 did not resolve a pre-existing ambiguity in 
S 2D1.1(c)'s definition of "cocaine base." Prior to 
Amendment 487's effective date, no court of appeals held 
that cocaine base meant only crack and excluded all other 
forms of cocaine base. Supra, at 9-10. Unlike our decision 
in Marmolejos, where we concluded that the Sentencing 
Commission's amendment resolved an ambiguous 
application note, see Marmolejos, 140 F.3d at 491, 
S 2D1.1(c) was not ambiguous prior to Amendment 487. 
 
In Marmolejos, we examined Application Note 12 to 
S 2D1.1, which provided instructions for determining the 
quantity of controlled substances when the offense involved 
a negotiation to traffic such substances. 140 F.3d at 490. 
We noted that "[t]he prior text of the application note 
provided no guidance as to what amount of drugs a court 
should consider in sentencing a defendant convicted of 
participating in a completed transaction." Id . at 491. We 
held, therefore, that "the terms of the previous application 
note were facially ambiguous; the note spoke only to 
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uncompleted deals." Id. Here, the prior text of S 2D1.1(c) 
provided the courts with guidance as to what type of 
controlled substance should be subject to an enhanced 
sentence -- i.e., cocaine base. We discern no facial 
ambiguity in the pre-1993 version of S 2D1.1(c) such that 
one could reasonably read the term cocaine base to mean 
only crack. Accordingly, we view Amendment 487 as a 
substantive amendment, which narrowed the category of 
controlled substances subject to enhanced penalties from 
all forms of cocaine base to a single type, crack. 
 
As a final point, we note that our result is supported by 
the four other courts of appeals that have issued a 
published opinion addressing the retroactivity of 
Amendment 487. See United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488, 
489-90 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d 
1048, 1053 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Samuels, 59 
F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Camacho, 40 
F.3d 349, 354 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 
B. 
 
We now turn to the second claim Roberson raised on 
appeal -- viz., that his attorney at sentencing and on direct 
appeal was constitutionally ineffective for failing to argue, 
based on the legal distinction between crack and other 
forms of cocaine base, that Roberson should not have been 
sentenced under S 2D1.1's enhanced sentencing provisions. 
 
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
Roberson must show that his attorney's performance fell 
outside "the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 
(1984), and that his attorney's deficient performance 
resulted in prejudice, which the Supreme Court has defined 
as "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Id. at 694. In reviewing counsel's 
performance, we "must judge the reasonableness of 
counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular 
case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Id. at 
690. In this case, Roberson essentially contends that his 
attorney's performance was deficient because he failed to 
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argue, based on the legal distinction between crack and 
other forms of cocaine base, that Roberson should not have 
been sentenced under S 2D1.1(c)'s enhanced sentencing 
provisions for cocaine base.7 App. at 9. We are 
unpersuaded. 
 
The District Court sentenced Roberson in July 1989, 
App. at 185, and we denied his direct appeal in December 
1989. As we have already observed, the Sentencing 
Commission did not create a legal distinction between crack 
and other forms of cocaine base until almost four years 
later, and prior to that time, no court of appeals had held 
that cocaine base, as defined in S 2D1.1(c), meant only 
crack and no other form of cocaine base. Supra , at 9-10. 
Because "there is no general duty on the part of defense 
counsel to anticipate changes in the law," Sistrunk, 96 F.3d 
at 670-71 (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989)), we hold that 
counsel's failure to make an argument based on 
S 2D1.1(c)'s distinction between crack and cocaine base 
does not fall outside "the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance." And since we conclude that 
Roberson failed to show that his counsel's performance was 
deficient, we need not reach the issue of whether he was 
prejudiced by his attorney's representation. See Sistrunk, 
96 F.3d at 673 n.8 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 
("[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective 
assistance claim to . . . address both components of the 
inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on 
one."). 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that a district court would have 
precluded Roberson from filing his second S 2255 motion 
under pre-AEDPA law. Therefore, we hold that applying 
AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions to his second S 2255 
motion cannot work an impermissible retroactive effect. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note that when Roberson filed his firstS 2255 motion pro se 
approximately two years after the District Court imposed its sentence, 
see App. at 23-24, Roberson did not distinguish between crack and 
cocaine base. 
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Because Roberson's second S 2255 motion does not satisfy 
AEDPA's new substantive standards for filing a second 
motion, we deny Roberson's request for authorization to 
proceed with his second motion. 
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